ABSTRACT An application programming interface (API) is an excellent feature since it is a procedure call interface to an operating system resource. Behavior features based on API play an important role in analyzing malware variants. However, the existing malware detection approaches have a lot of complex operations on construction and matching. Graph matching is an NP-complete problem and is time-consuming because of computational complexity. To address these issues, a promising approach is proposed to construct the classified behavior features from different malware families. In the proposed approach, a classified behavior feature consists of a kernel object (an API call parameter) and a series of operations (an API trace). Besides, a classified behavior graph (CBG) is represented as a number by hash to reduce workload and matching time. Subsequently, multiple machine learning classifiers are used for system classification. In particular, to verify the efficiency of our approach, we perform a series of experiments with different families. The experiments on 1220 malware samples show that the true positive rate is up to 88.3% and the false positive rate keeps within 3.9% by the support vector machine (SVM).
I. INTRODUCTION
Today Internet and IoT are the main data sources of the society. However, malware is one of the major threats to Internet and IoT. Usually malware includes virus, worms, Trojans and bots, etc. At their malware zoo, AV TEST reported more than 600 million samples of malware, and it exceeds 120 million in 2016 [1] . Signature-based malware detection is the most widely utilized in commercial anti-virus (AV) software [2] . And a signature-based approach has the advantages of fast scanning speed and high accuracy rate by using a pattern-matching approach. However, with increasingly obfuscation techniques, the malware employed polymorphic and metamorphic strategies can evade detection by generating many new variants [3] . Meanwhile, these techniques have led to the number of malware variants. Furthermore, as the explosive growth of malware, it is hard for a signature-based
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A potential solution is API call graph which is more resilient to the code obfuscation techniques which are commonly used by malware authors. Moreover, the behavior features are extracted from API call graph to detect malware variants. However, the construction of the API call graph for a program is difficult. Furthermore, graph matching is an NP-complete problem and is time consuming because of computational complexity. Many existing graph matching algorithms cannot scale to large graphs. Therefore, a good solution is the classified behavior graph (CBG) that is directly extracted from API call sequences.
In this paper, to detect malware variants, we present a novel feature extraction approach based on the classified behaviors features.
The contributions of this paper are shown below: -We present a new feature selection approach based on the classified behaviors. By API call sequence and its parameters, we classify the behaviors of a program. -We captured the real malware classified behaviors that can be help to analyze malware variant.
-We developed a system named Magpie based on our approach and used it on the target host. By using the CBGs, our malware detection system can improve the efficiency and accuracy of detecting malware variants.
-We demonstrate that our approach is feasible and usable in practice on the datasets by experiments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review and discuss the related work. Section III introduces the model and problem statement. Section IV presents the system details of mining the classified behaviors. Section V describes the classifier in detail. Performance evaluation is provided in Section VI. Finally, conclusion remarks are given in Section VII. The basic notations used throughput this paper are listed in Table 1 .
II. RELATED WORK
With the increasing malware attacks and smart devices connection into IoT environment, security is not a separate event [4] , [5] . Behavior-based analysis plays a more important role in analyzing malware variants.
A. BEHAVIOR-BASED ANALYSIS
Although most of the malware in the same family have different code structures, their aims are the same. Therefore, they share similar behaviors. Based on this fact, a behaviorbased signature is constructed for all malware in the same family. By this way, it not only greatly reduces the number of the features in the signature database, but also it reduces the frequency of the system upgrade. Besides, the behavior-based malware detection systems can detect variants of the known malware.
The core of the MS Windows OS consists of thousands of APIs. The API is a set of commands, functions, and return values. By these APIs the programmers can interact with the operation system [6] . Since API is the interface of program and operating system, API function calls reflect the behaviors of software. Depending on API calls provided by operating system, malware can access system resources (kernel objects) so as to achieve their malicious tasks. Therefore, the malware detection systems based on API calls can capture real malicious characteristics during runtime and are robust to any code obfuscation techniques employed by malware authors.
There have been various studies based on the API call sequence in the malware detection. Hofmevr et al. [7] constructed a normal behavior profile and an intrusion detection to detect the malware by utilizing hamming distance matching. The scheme regards short API call sequence as a feature of malware. Ye et al. [8] analyzed API call sequence that extracted from portable executable files and constructed Intelligent Malware Detection System (IMDS). Sathyanarayan et al. [9] extracted the frequency of critical API calls from a program. Moreover, they created a behavior profile of a program and created a signature for an entire malware family by statistical comparison. Christodorescu et al. [10] constructed malware behavior specifications on data-flow dependencies among system calls (named system call dependency graph, SCDG) for a malware sample, which capture relationships between system calls and resist random system call injection attack.
However, previous works on behavior-based malware detection are based on static analysis. So far these approaches rely on disassembly to identify malicious behavior, and they use control flow analysis and data flow analysis [11] . To overcome the limitations of static analysis, dynamic behavior-based analysis has gained much interest. For example, Fredrikson et al. [12] and Jha et al. [13] proposed a scheme to extract the optimally discriminative specification for identifying a class of programs by dynamic analysis, which can be used to detect the suspicious behaviors by utilizing the graph theory and concept analysis.
In malware detection based on dynamic analysis, it is a better choice to combine API call sequence with N-gram algorithm. Eskandari et al. [14] adopted fixed-length n-gram to process API call sequence and used API fragments to constitute the feature set. Subsequently, Du et al. [15] used variable-length N-gram algorithm to create the feature set. Lee et al. [16] classified API by its type, then extracted features by n-gram and automatically grouped the different types of malware based on clustering coefficient. These approaches have the advantages of simple feature construction and low computational complexity. However, without considering API parameters, these approaches are incapable of capturing some malware that utilize the obfuscation techniques by inserting independent API call or irrelevant API call.
Ahmed et al. [17] have proved that the combination of API calls and parameters (as spatiotemporal features set) can improve the detection accuracy rather than standalone API call or parameters set. Simultaneously, Bayer et al. [18] extracted the behavior profiles from API calls sequences and their parameters of malware samples by Anubis sandbox. Then they clustered these samples by the behavior profiles. Schwartz et al. [19] presented dynamic taint analysis VOLUME 7, 2019 approach to process API calls and their parameters, and then they found the relations of the API and used them in a security context. Cesare et al. [20] constructed a feature vector by using fixed size k-subgraphs of the API control flow graph, and they proposed a novel distance metric to match graphs. Elhadi et al. [21] constructed an API call graph for each malware sample by integrating API calls and operating system resource. Then they used the advanced graph edit distance algorithm to the graph matching. These approaches have high accuracy. Generally, a program has hundreds or thousands of vertices or edges in its SCDG [22] . Therefore, the SCDG is hard to construct. Furthermore, the graph matching algorithm is needed to obtain the common subgraph. However, graph matching is obviously an NP-complete problem. To address these problems, all the API can be classified according to their functions. Then, the classified behavior graph (CBG) is derived. And the number of vertices or edges in a CBG is generally less than seven. Therefore, the CBG is constructed easily. The CBG is adopted directly as a feature in our system, although hundreds of the CBGs can also constitute a SCDG and the common subgraphs are obtained from the SCDGs by graph matching. Besides, each CBG is represented as a number by hash to improve the matching speed and reduce the workload. Another benefit is that the classified behaviors are help to analyze malware variants. A new malware variant is created when some classified behaviors of a known malware are replaced by those of another malware. Therefore, the malicious intent of a program can be found by the classified behaviors. Table 2 summarizes some of the recent malware detection techniques and compares between them in terms of features extraction, features selection, and detection rate.
B. MALWARE ANALYSIS
Malware analysis is divided into two general categories: static analysis and dynamic analysis. Static analysis examines the code without executing it and has been proposed for years. Generally, it is hard to receive source code of malware samples, so static analysis has to retrieve the information from the binary of the malware by reverse engineering or by some tools such as UPX, IDA pro. The most benefit of static analysis is that all traces can be found by this approach. However, in order to prevent the codes from analyzing, the self-modifying techniques, such as packer, encryption and compression, can be used by the malware authors [23] . Moreover, self-protection techniques have been widely adopted by a number of new malwares such as polymorphic and metamorphic [24] . Furthermore, various packer tools are used for malicious code, which has brought a lot of work for malware analysts and even sometimes makes analysis unsuccessfully. On the other hand, dynamic analysis is a promising solution for overcoming the limitations of static analysis. Generally, dynamic analysis involves analyzing the behavior of malware by executing it. In order to receive the malicious behavior, malware is executed in a controlled environment and its run-time behavior is being monitored. In faction, a virtual machine or sandbox is used for dynamic analysis, because this process is dangerous. Normally, the sandboxes include Anubis, Norman Sandbox, Cuckoo Sandbox, Joe Sandbox. . . [25] Although dynamic malware analysis only finds some traces and is escaped by advanced malware, it can easily detect malware variants with any code-obfuscation technologies. Taking these facts into consideration, dynamic malware analysis is selected in our approach.
Different from the previous works, a novel feature extraction approach based on the classified behavior features is presented to detect malware variants in this paper.
III. MOTIVATING AND OVERVIEW OF MODEL
The goal of our system is to detect malware variants employed obfuscation technologies offline on host. Moreover, the system should be general and not incorporate a priori knowledge about a malware family. In this section, we demonstrate the whole workflow in Fig. 1 . First, API calls and their parameters are extracted from the malware samples or benign samples by the dynamic analysis technique. Second, the finer malicious behaviors are mined from these API calls by the parameters. Finally, the malicious classified behaviors are derived by statistical comparison.
A. FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW Figure 1 gives an overview of our framework Magpie for our malware detection system. Firstly, a training dataset and a testing dataset consists of malware samples, benign samples, and randomly selected test samples. And then these samples are monitored in Cuckoo sandbox for obtaining the API calls and the parameters. The information is stored in a manner of JSON. Secondly, a data preprocessing Python module is developed to select API calls and their parameters from the JSON files. Thirdly, the classified behaviors are constructed. And a behavior signature of a malware family is extracted from the classified behaviors by using machine learning techniques. Finally, a malware variants detection system Magpie based on these behavior signatures is developed.
B. API CALL SEQUENCE EXTRACTION
Above all, API call sequence and their parameters are extracted from the malware samples and benign programs by the dynamic analysis technique. Actually, the programs are executed in Cuckoo Sandbox that is an open source simulator of operating system. In the process, the running-time and result of the samples must be enough to filter out the malware with escaping technology. From the dynamic execution trace of malware variants and benign programs, some information including API calls names, their parameters, and other details is gathered in JSON format. For that, the functional module is created by Python language to process these files, meanwhile, API calls and their parameters derived by the module are stored in a MySQL database.
A large amount of API can complete various functions, which results in quite different in the form of its parameters, so it is difficult to process these parameters directly. To reduce the workload, all the API can be divided into seven categories according to their functions, namely, file, register, services, network, process, synchronization and system (i.e., Microsoft kernel object) [26] . Additionally, each type of API focuses on their proper parameters. Subsequently, the traces of the samples are extracted based on these parameters in the next step.
C. API TRACE EXTRACTION
In general, the behavior of a program is described as its observable effect on a sandbox [27] . In this paper, we only consider a series of API invoked that have a relationship by their parameters, which is named API trace. Therefore, our approach can detect malware variants with any code-obfuscation technologies.
Firstly, according to the previous parameters (kernel objects), API calls divided into different API traces that consists of several APIs. And each API trace is arranged according to the execution of API calls, which has at least a same parameter. Then, each API trace is restored in categories according to the parameter and considered as a fine classified behavior of the sample. Specifically, the number of the API traces that are extracted from a sample is varies in different categories, respectively.
1) AGGREGATION
As the parameters are selected, some APIs that have similar operations on the same resource are combined. For example, to a continuous series of operations on the same system VOLUME 7, 2019 resource (the same handle or filename), they can be regarded as one if the API names and their parameters are also the same. This operation has two advantages. First, the number of API can decrease, which can reduce the memory requirements and the calculation time to the later steps. Second, the approach can resist some relevant API inserting attacks.
2) REQUIREMENTS OF API TRACE
The following two requirements must be satisfied for constructing of the API trace.
Requirement 1: API trace is a sequence of APIs with execution sequence dependency. In an API trace, each API invoked is arranged according to its execution order. That is, an API trace is a subsequence of the API call sequence that extracted from Cuckoo sandbox.
Requirement 2: API trace must depend on the relative operation. It is observed that API must use system resources to complete an operation and the system resources are represented as their parameters, such as filename or handle. Therefore, each API trace is only constructed by each parameter selected previously.
The direct application of this rule to an API call sequence leads to create a large number of false API links, because some parameters are integer values. An integer value often appears as a parameter to unrelated system calls, for example, handles in Microsoft Windows are identified to system resources but they can be reuse. To prevent this problem, API trace can be separated when the system resources are reused. Moreover, API trace can also be separated by the allocation API such as FileClose, RegCloseKey.
In Fig. 2 , the API traces are extracted from the API call sequence of the malware Delf.dsb by our approach. Moreover, the API traces are the malicious classified behaviors of the malware.
In Fig. 2 , the behaviors of Trajan Delf.dsb can be divided into two categories: file and register. In Fig. 2c , Delf.dsb copied the temp file to system directory. In fact, it is a malicious classified behavior. In Fig. 2d , the four API calls on register satisfy the dependence by the parametert 3 , which implemented restarting the file itself at the next system boot. Figure 2 shows that how the two classified behavior graphs are constructed.
D. PARAMETER NORMALIZATION
Parameter normalization has been investigated to canonize malware before string scanning and increases detection rates of malware variants [28] . Note that registry key class parameters do not need to be normalized. The objects of normalization are a lot of temporary variables invoked by the API, e.g., the handle is a decimal integer number. By using the special value instead of the handle, the parameters are normalized in these API traces. Subsequently, the number of API traces is greatly reduced because a large number of API traces are removed due to aggregate. Furthermore, the same API trace can be extracted from among the different samples by parameter normalization. Finally, on these bases the common classified behavior of a malware family is derived. In Table 3 , some of the normalization parameters allow us to capture information flows.
In our system, the similar behaviors are found by the parameters normalization in different samples. Practically, the same API trace is regarded as a fine behavior feature of the sample. In Fig. 2c , Trajan Delf.dsb has a file classified behavior CopyFileA(t 1 ,t 2 ), it copy C:\user\temp\Delf.dsb(t 1 ) to C:\WINDOWS\system\zhqb080103.exe (t 2 ). By the parameter normalization of t 1 and t 2 , it is normalized to CopyFileA(xxx\temp\xxxxx, C:\Windows\system\xxxxx). Similarly, Trajan Delf.fnt has a file classified behavior CopyFileA(C:\user\temp\ Delf.fnt, C:\WINDOWS\ system\ddu.exe). Furthermore, it can also be normalized to CopyFileA(xxx\temp\xxxxx, C:\Windows\system\xxxxx). And so, a file classified behavior of the malware family Delf is found. In fact, the classified behavior is malicious because it can copy the temp file to system directory.
The detailed descriptions of the proposed approach for constructing classified behaviors are summarized in Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, all classified behaviors of all samples can be obtained. Then, the common classified behaviors of the family need to be extracted from all classified behaviors. However, using graph matching directly will result in massive workload. To reduce the workload, a hash function is used in our system, since a hash function can map the fixed size data from the arbitrary size data. By grouping and mapping the hash, each API trace is transformed into a unique decimal number. In this way, it becomes simple and effective to string comparisons instead of complex parameter comparisons.
Algorithm 1

E. DIMENSIONALITY REDUCTION
After processing the above steps, a large number of API traces are created. For example, the number of API traces is 59,107 in the parameter named filename according to the Table 5 . Moreover, the features of the samples are so large that they are not used as signatures to detect malware variants. To solve the problem, the dimension of the behavior feature needs to be reduced. The process of dimensionality reduction is explained in more detail in subsection A of Section IV.
F. CLASSIFIER
Machine learning includes supervised learning for malware detection and classification and unsupervised learning for malware clustering. Supervised learning algorithms include SVM [29] , Decision Tree (DT) [30] , and Naive Bayes (NB). The details of these classifiers are explained in Section V. By these classifiers, the optimal model is established and the candidate set with the optimal effect is determined. And then each classified behavior in a set is the optimal classified behavior (OCB). Furthermore, the signature for the malware or their families is based on the optimal classified behaviors.
IV. SYSTEM DETAILS
A series of operations invoked by a program and the relationships among them is treated as a behavior. The data dependence graphs of the API trace are used to construct a behavior. Dependences between APIs are encoded as the constrained parameters, e.g., t 3 in Fig. 2d . Additionally, APIs in the dependence graph can be constrained using parameters constraints. For example, the third node RegQueryValueExA in Fig. 2d has two local constraints (i.e., t 3 , t 5 ). Any parameter with support for modular and bit-vector arithmetic, arrays, and existential and universal quantifiers is sufficient to represent our constraints on APIs [10] . Let denote the set of APIs, where t i is the ith parameter of the API. Let V ars denote the set of variables that appear in action. The set × V ars represents the set of APIs with parameters. An API has the uninterpreted variables from V ars as parameters, which is named as an operation.
Definition 1(Behavior): A behavior is a directed acyclic graph G = (V , E, f , h), where:
• V is the set of vertices, each vertex corresponds to an operation from × V ars
• E is the set of edges, E ⊆ V × V corresponds to the parameters t dependencies between two operations, where t ∈ V ars
• f is a function, f : V → × V ars associates vertices with the name of their operations
• h is a function, h : V ∪ E → t associates vertices with edges contains the parameter t, where the vertices and edges are capable of expressing constraints on operations and the dependencies between their arguments that presents they use the same parameter t.
An operation o can be named as events, operations and system calls in the context of malware detection. A behavior G = (V , E, f , h) of a program is an API trace that extracted from its API call sequence. Furthermore, an API trace is a sequence of the operation invocations T o = o 1 , o 2 , o 3 , . . . , o n that must satisfy the following properties:
1) Corresponding to an operation invocated in the trace, every operation in the behavior and its parameters satisfy the VOLUME 7, 2019 constraints in the formula 1:
2) The edges connecting behavior operations correspond to the pair of operation invocated in the trace, and their relations must satisfy the formula 2:
A behavior graph g is a small data-flow (and sometimes control-flow) graph. And the behaviors are divided into seven categories according to their API functions. Therefore, the behavior graph by definition 1 is treated as a classified behavior graph (i.e., CBG) of a program. Essentially, it is an API trace extracted from the API call sequence. For example, in Fig. 2d , it is a CBG. Three APIs (RegOpenKey, RegQueryValueExA, and RegCloseKey) are the members of the , and four parameters (t 3 , t 4 , t 5 , and t 6 ) are the members of the V ars . And the four operations consist of them: o 1 (RegOpenKey(t 3 , t 4 )), o 2 (RegQueryValueExA(t 3 , t 5 )), o 3 (RegQueryValueExA(t 3 , t 6 , t 5 )), and o 4 (RegCloseKey(t 3 )). Each vertex is an operation about register, e.g., the RegOpenKey node has its argument t 3 constrained by the operation o 1 (Equation 1 ). In fact, the register classified behavior is a sequence of operation invocations (an API trace) 4 . The vertices and the edge set E satisfy the requirements described earlier. Furthermore, all vertices and their corresponding operations in the trace are constrained by the parameter t 3 (Formula 2).
A. CANDIDATE BEHAVIOR SIGNATURE
According to the above approach, all behaviors of a program are represented as a sequence that consists of these classified behavior graphs. However, most of the behaviors defined play an insignificant role in differentiating malware from benign programs. On the contrary, excessive behavior features will lead to a larger dimension, which will increase the calculation of classifiers and reduce the classification accuracy. Therefore, amount behaviors are eliminated because they are trivial and irrelevant to system security. Furthermore, the classified behavior of the malware family is the focus of our attention. To reduce the dimensionality of these behaviors, the candidate behaviors are obtained by statistical comparison.
Definition 2 (pretreated behavior): Given a classified behavior graph g, a set of the training samples D that can be divided two categories: Benign (B) and Malware (M), let Ng (B) denote the number of the samples that the classified behavior graph g occurs in the benign ones, Ng (M ) is the number of the samples that the classified behavior graph g in malware family (M). Our purpose is discovering the classified behaviors of the malware families, so the unique classified behavior of the malware sample and those ones that often occur in benign samples are eliminated in the data preprocessing stage. Therefore, a pretreated behavior g is obtained if N g (M ) is greater than three and N g (B) is less than three. Given definition 2, the classified pretreated behaviors are discovered and the dimensionality of the classified behaviors has been greatly reduced.
Information gain (IG) is the reduction of entropy (or uncertainty) caused by partitioning a collection of examples according to a feature (a behavior graph g). It is a measure of the effectiveness of a behavior in classifying examples [31] . The information gain of a given behavior graph g is defined in Eq. (3), and the malicious classified behavior is selected by computing the information gain for each malware family. Where the classified behavior is an API trace.C denotes the class of the samples and can be divided into several categories: Benign (B), worms (NetSky, Mydoom. . . ), Trajan (LdPinch, DNSchange. . . ) and virus. Vg denotes the value of the behavior graph g; Vg = 1 if the behavior graph g occurs in the sample, it is 0, otherwise. P(Vg, C) denotes the proportion that behavior graph has the value V g in the class C. P (Vg) is the proportion that the behavior graph g has the value has the value in the training dataset.P (C) denotes the proportion of the training samples belonging to the class C.
Information gain is a powerful statistical tool. By information gain, the candidate behaviors are selected from the pretreated behaviors. To reduce the number of the CBGs for each malware family, the value of N is set. In our experiments, the top N pretreated behaviors (candidate behaviors) are selected from each classified behavior set for each malware family according to information gain. Obviously, the number of the candidate behaviors is determined by the value of N . By this way, the number of candidate behaviors is reduced overwhelmingly in order to achieve the conditions for scientific operation on the host computer. Moreover, the four candidate sets of the classified behaviors characteristics are created by the value of N .
B. BEHAVIOR SIGNATURE
A detection system is developed based on the candidate behaviors by using machine learning techniques. For more exploration several classifiers are employed to evaluate accuracy of detection system based on the behaviors. Then, the optimal classified behaviors are extracted from the candidate behaviors sets. Each optimal behavior is treated a fine malicious behavior. The behaviors signature of each malware family consists of the optimal behaviors. Let l denote the number of the optimal behaviors g in the behavior signature, then the behavior profile of the sample is represented as a sequence (g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g l ) .
First, the signature function S is defined to distinguish whether a given optimal classified behavior is in a malware family. The formula is as follows:
where S g j , C i denotes the Boolean value of the signature related to g j and C i , g j is the jth optimal classified behavior in the signature dataset and C i denotes the ith malware family in training dataset. S g j , C i = 1 denotes that the optimal classified behavior g j occurs frequently or repeatedly in the malware family C i , it is 0, otherwise. Then, the signature of the malware family C i is represented as an l dimensional binary vector
, where l denotes the number of the optimal behaviors in the behavior signature. Similarly, the sample x i in training dataset can be represented as a binary vector (S (g 1 ,
V. CLASSIFIERS A. CLASSIFIER DT C4.5 is chosen when the decision tree classifier is used. Compared to ID3, C4.5 uses information gain ratio (IGR) to select the feature, which remedies the shortcomings of IG that tends to select the properties with more values. Actually, C4.5 normalizes information gain by the values of split information (Splitinfo). The split information of a given behavior graph g is defined as follows:
Therefore, the information gain ratio of a given behavior graph g is defined as follows:
where |D| denotes the number of the samples in the datasets D, C i is the family of the sample and the value of v denotes the total number of the class in the dataset.
B. TWO-SVM
Two-class SVM is a binary classifier which searches for a hyperplane in which the two classes can be separated with the largest margin. In the hyperplane, the margin is the nearest distance between all samples that belong to two classed respectively. Let the given training dataset be D =
, where
T is anl-dimensional vector and y i represents the value of the class of the sample xi. The hyperplane can be represented as f (x) = ω T x + b, where ω denotes the normal vector that can decided the direct of the hyperplane,b denotes the bias and the L 2 -norm of the vector ω is represented as ω . When few samples in the new feature space are nonlinear, the maximal soft margin can be formulated as the optimization problem:
where C > 0 is a constant, it is also used to solve the overfitting problem. ξ i = max(0, 1 − y i (ω T x i + b)) are the term slack variables. This is a model of two-class SVM. Moreover, it is a problem of convex quadratic programming. Therefore, the model can be transformed into the dual problem by Lagrange multipliers α i ≥ 0 [32] . Then, the equivalent dual formulation of the problem can be expressed as follows:
where α = {α 1 ; α 2 ; . . . ; α m } . . By the above model, most samples in the dataset are classified correctly when they are linearly separable. Simultaneously, this denotes that our approach of the optimal classified features extracted from API sequences is effective and efficient. However, when most samples in the dataset are nonlinear, the kernel function is selected in SVM. By the approach, the original data can be transformed into a high-dimensional feature space for better separation. Definition 3 (kernel function): Let φ (x) represents the vector maps the feature vector x, the kernel function is defined as follows:
where a polynomial kernel κ x i , x j = x T i x j d is selected as the kernel function because the above two cases are considered. That is, d is a positive integer that denotes whether the feature space is transformed. The ultimate model of the SVM with soft margin can be expressed as follows:
In summary, all the models are the optimization problems about the parameter α.
C. OPTIMIZATION OBJECTIVE FUNCTION BY SMO ALGORITHM
In the solving process of the ultimate optimization objective function, the condition of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) must satisfy. However, the complexity of solving the problem is directly proportional to the number of samples. Therefore, Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) algorithm is used for the optimization problem [33] . The accuracy range ε is introduced to improve the SMO algorithm. Normally, the value of toleration ε and the constant C are 0.001 and 1.0, respectively [34] .
D. MULTICLASS SVM
Since the samples in the dataset belong to many families, multiclass SVM (MCSVM) is achieved indirectly. Traditionally, the pattern types of MCSVM are: one-versus-one schema, one-versus-rest schema, and directed acyclic graph SVM (DAGSVM) schema that based on o-versus-o [35] .
Apparently, for a case of v classes, 'one-versus-one' schema needs v (v − 1)/2 two-class SVM classifiers where each one is trained on the union of the training samples for two classes. Let C = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C v } denote a set of v classes of training samples, where C i denotes the ith class of training samples, i = 1, 2, . . . , v. Therefore, thirty-six training samples sets are constructed corresponding to the training samples of the nine classes. To a new benign sample or malware variant, the number of the class Num i adds one when it is determined to belong to the class C i by each binary SVM. Then, the decision is the Max (Num 1 , Num 2 , . . . , Num v ).
VI. EXPERIMENTATION AND EVALUATION
This section describes the results of evaluating the proposed approach. Experimental setup, experimental metrics, and experimental results are introduced. And the detection rate, effectiveness and scalability of the proposed approach are examined in detail.
A. EXPERIMENT SETUP
In this research, MS Windows malware are the focus of our work. A malware dataset has been downloaded from http://www.vx.netux.org/website. The dataset consists of 171 benign programs and 1220 malware samples. In the dataset, from the FTP server and MS Windows series, the benign executables are obtained. And a partial list of malware families and their types are provided in Table 4 .
API calls and parameters of samples are dynamically extracted from a virtual machine that are installed Microsoft Windows XP SP3. Moreover, some popular software is installed on the machine such as Python, Microsoft Office, and Foxmail. The experiments are performed on the Dell PowerEdge R720 server and the hardware configuration includes Xeon E5 2.5GHz x2 processor and 16 GB of RAM. And the server is installed Ubuntu 14.04 server 64-bit operation system and the sandbox is Cuckoo 1.2. To get the executable binary's malicious behaviors, 120 seconds are selected for its run time and the size of file is more than 1 MB, which can filter out the malware with escaping technology. To reduce variability, ten-fold cross validation is selected.
B. EVALUATION MEASURE
First of all, given dataset D = x i , y j i = 1, 2, . . . , m , where m represents the number of samples in the dataset, x i is a sample in test set, y j is the label of the x i in dataset. All samples in the dataset are divided into v categories: C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C v and y i ∈ {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C v }. In our experiments, the value of v is nine.
TP i (true positive) refers to the number of the samples in C i that can be correctly classified.
FN i (false negative) refers to the number of the samples in C i that can be wrongly classified.
FP i (false positive) refers to the number of the samples in other class that are regarded as in C i .
For evaluating our approach, some measures are used as described below:
1) TPR The true positive rate (TPR) also refers to recall or sensitivity, is used to measure the percentage of actual samples which are correctly identified. In malware family C i , it is defined as follows:
2) FPR The false positive rate (FPR) in malware family C i is defined as follows:
3) Precision The precision is used to measure the percentage of actual samples in the ones that are identified as a class. In malware family C i , it is described as follows:
4) Accuracy
The accuracy is the overall accuracy of the system to detect malware and benign samples, the equation is described as follows:
Note that, the overall TPR is also defined as accuracy. 5) F 1 -score F 1 -score is a weighted harmonic average between Precision and recall [21] , the formula is shown as follows: 
C. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
1) EXPERIMENT RESULTS
By definition 1, the classified behaviors (original) are achieved and unique. And they present all the features of all samples in the datasets. In our experiments, the total number reached 145,475. The number of the partial API traces is shown in table 5. Table 5 shows that the number of the original behaviors is too large to process by our experimental computer. For example, the number of API traces is 59,107 in the parameter named filename. Therefore, the original behaviors need be pretreated. By Definition 2, pretreated behaviors are obtained and the number of them is reduced greatly. Subsequently, candidate behaviors are selected by information gain.
2) EFFECTIVENESS
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our system, we first generated classified behavior for malware families. An overview of detection of these families by the classified behavior filename is provided in Table 6 . Table 6 shows the result of the candidate classified behaviors filename by DT. The accuracy of our malware detection system can obtain 72.8% by only one classified behavior. It demonstrates that the classified behaviors are effective in detecting malware variants. To the malware family DNChange, the TP rate is 92.5% and the FP rate is zero. This illustrates that the classified behaviors filename is efficient for them. However, the classified behaviors filename are low accuracy at detecting malware family MyDoom because the TP rate of them is zero. Therefore, by classifying the malware behaviors, the real malicious behaviors can be captured, which is help to analysis malware family and their variants. Table 7 shows the result of each family by the optimal classified behaviors (signature), respectively. The TP rate of our malware detection system can obtain 88.3% with FPR is 3.9% by using SVM. Especially, the TP rate of the malware family DNChange achieved 99.2% when the FP rate is 0%. The experiment fully demonstrates that our detection system based on the classified behaviors is effective and efficient in some families.
It is effective that we classify the behaviors into seven categories. Many malware families exhibit different behaviors. For example, in Table 6 , the TP rate of the malware family Mydoom is zero, which indicates that the classified behaviors named filename play no effective in them. By statistics comparison, the classified behaviors of filename appear not only in Mydoom, but also in other malware family. Therefore, the information gains of these classified behaviors get smaller, which indicates that they contribute little to malware family detection and are eliminated. In this situation, no sample in malware family Mydoom is detected by the classified behaviors of filename. However, in table 7, the TP rate of Mydoom is up to 81.8%. It indicates that other classified behaviors can distinguish them from other malware families or benign samples. That is, different types of malware have the different classified behaviors. By comparing the various behaviors of all malware, the seven classified behaviors are obtained.
3) SCALABILITY
To demonstrate the scalability of our malware system, all viruses cannot be classified by their malware families. In the cause, the TPR of our system is 88.4% by SVM when the FPR is 6.4% in Table 7 . It demonstrates that the classified behaviors signature of malware family has strong generalization ability and is easy to detect the variants of the known mal-VOLUME 7, 2019 ware. Although the FP rate of all viruses had slightly higher FPR, the overall average FPR was 3.9%.
D. PARAMETERS SELECTION
Firstly, the candidate classified behavior features sets are obtained by the value of N . And the results can be obtained on these sets. Secondly, to the classifier SVM, the optimal value of the parameter d is obtained by the experiments. Moreover, the optimal F 1 -score needs to be found because of the contradiction between FTP and TPR. Finally, the optimal accuracy of the system is obtained on these bases. Furthermore, the optimal classified behaviors features are found and the final model is selected.
To quantify the significance of the malicious behavior, we use the information gain between malware samples and benign programs. According to the information gain, the candidate behaviors of each malware family are selected from the pretreated behaviors. The accuracy of the system varies with the value N , and the experimental results are shown in Fig. 3 .
In Fig. 3a , the number of the candidate behaviors sets is shown by changing the values of N from 10 to 40. Therefore, the optimal classified behaviors signature can be derived from them. Fig. 3b shows the comparison of evaluation indexes by NB in these cases. The max TPR is 71.8% and the min FPR is 5.0% when the parameter value of N is 30. Fig. 3c shows the comparison of evaluation indexes by DT. The max TPR is 83.7% and the min FPR is 5.4% when the parameter value of N is 40. Fig. 3d shows the comparison of evaluation indexes by SVM. The max TPR is 88.3% and the min FPR is 3.9% when the parameter value of N is 30. Therefore, the system based the classified behaviors is the best when the parameter value of N is 30 and the value of d is 1: at this point, the number of the optimal behaviors features is 1708 and the TPR is 88.3% by SVM. Fig. 3 indicates that the classified behaviors are very effective against malware. Polynomial kernel can judge whether the data is linearly separable. This is one of the reasons why we choose it. When d = 1, the kernel function degenerate liner kernel and the feature space is invariant. On the contrary, the kernel is transformed into polynomial kernel. When d > 1, which means the feature space is mapped the higher dimensional space. In Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b , as the value of parameter d increases, the value of TPR and Precision decrease while the value of FPR increases. Therefore, the optimal value of d is 1. Furthermore, the experimental results show that the samples in dataset is linear separable. Fig. 5 illustrates the F 1 -score and accuracy of three machine learning classifiers on the different candidate classified behaviors sets when the optimal value of d is 1. The F 1 -score value (84.4%) is highest when the value of N is 30; furthermore, the F 1 -score value and the accuracy value are the highest at this time. Fig. 5a shows that the optimal classifier is SVM when the value of N is 30. Fig. 5b shows the changes of accuracy on the different candidate sets. And the accuracy value is 88.3% when the value of N is 30 and the classifier is SVM. According to the experimental results, the value of F 1 -score is very similar to the accuracy. Therefore, the optimal classified behaviors are found and the signature for each malware family is created by them. Finally, 1,708 optimal classified behaviors are identified, and the signature of each malware family consists of them. A summary of the classified-behavior-mining data is shown in Table 8 , which lists for each malware sample the number of expert-provided malspecs, the number of mined malspecs [10] , the number of the optimal classified behaviors (OCBs) of the malware family, the total number of OCBs of each malware, and the number of OCBs matching their malware family signature.
Moreover, the Matching signature column lists the number of the OCBs that matched those from the signature of the malware family. For example, the number of the signature of the malware family Netsky is 81. Netsky.F has 101 OCBs, where 77 OCBs are in the signature of the Netsky family, and 24 OCBS are in other malware families, which leads to a small false alarm rate. And the HOLMES based on these mined malspecs sustained 86% detection rate on the malware variants, with 0 false positives [12] . Furthermore, the accuracy of our system is 88.3% with 3.9% false positives. In addition, we noted that the number of the optimal classified behaviors is almost as large as the number of mined malspecs. The detection effect is similar while the classified behavior graph is easier to construct and match. The results of our evaluation indicate that the classified behaviors can be used as a powerful tool for analyzing malware variants.
E. VALIDITY
The proposed approach is based on the fact that malware programs belonging to a family have similar aims and thus similar behaviors despite their different code structures. Moreover, the behaviors are presented as the classified behavior extracted from the API trace. For mimicry attacks [36] , [37] , they can evade our detection approaches if malware authors directly implemented API functionality using low-level code instruction. However, the general attack approach of inserting no-ops or replacing system call parameters can be detected because our approach focuses on the API and its parameters. Moreover, the real API calls can be determined by our system based on dynamic analysis. Then, the real classified behavior can be captured and the system based on CBGs can detect malware variants.
VII. CONCLUSION
API-based dynamic behaviors have been employed widely to detect malware variants. However, it is hard to construct and match behavior graph. In this paper, a novel approach is proposed to construct behavior features that are classified by their API and parameters. Moreover, a system Magpie based on the classified behaviors is created to detect malware variants. Our approach is both effective and efficient, and thus, can be used at the end host.
This approach is invalid if the malware author does not pass API but directly accesses the underlying operation system resources. Therefore, it is a challenge to detect malware with hiding functionalities.
Note that our system is based on dynamic analysis, so it has the fundamental limitation of all dynamic approaches. For example, only partial behaviors of a sample instead of all execution paths are observed. In addition, some malware employ more advanced technologies to evade behavior based malware analysis. Some kind of malware can detect its running environment and it will not carry out any malicious behavior when it detects itself running in a sandbox rather than real physical machine. Therefore, our system cannot detect evasion malware [38] that malware authors use delays, time-triggered behavior, or command and control mechanisms to prevent malicious action during our analysis. Thus, it is a challenge to detect malware employed evasion techniques. Our system needs to be strengthened to better detect antidebugging functionality in the future.
